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ABSTRACT 
Agency theory predicts that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairman positions should be held by different 
individuals in order to protect shareholder’s interest. Though there are mixed evidences on CEO duality and firm per- 
formance, most research have found that there is negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.  
Although, in the last decades of the twentieth century, agency theory became the dominant force in the theoretical un- 
derstanding of corporate governance, it does not however cover all aspects of corporate governance. This paper aims to 
explore whether it is better to combine various theories in order to describe effective and good corporate governance or 
theorizing corporate governance based on one theory only. This will cover corporate governance theories which include 
agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, and institutional theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern business environment is changing in haste and it 
is forcing management and organizations to develop 
ethical responsibility, modern and profitable businesses. 
In recent decades, corporations have been found as lead- 
ing and powerful institution. Corporations didn’t limit 
their existence just within the developed nations rather 
they extended their reach to around the world depending 
on their size and capabilities. Existence of such powerful 
and leading organisations influences in various aspects 
such as the economies and socio cultural landscape of 
country. Due to various corporate scandals around the 
world including Enron, WorldCom, Marconi and Royal 
Ahold (Mir and Seboui, [1]) has shaken the trust of 
shareholders. Shareholders’ value is significantly af-
fected due to these scandals. Besides this emergence of 
technological era has accelerated the globalisation, which 
decline the governmental control. All these situations 
gave a wakeup call for greater accountability which is 
one of the mechanisms of corporate governance (Abdul- 
lah and Valentine, [2]). 
Therefore corporate governance has been recognised 
as significant element in managing corporations in mod-
ern global phenomenon. Corporate governance includes 
quite number theories. Therefore, this paper aims to in- 
vestigate whether it is better to combine more than  
agency theory in order to present a comprehensive theo- 
retical overview of good corporate governance or corpo- 
rate governance based on one theory only. In this vein 
theories going to be covered in this study include agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and insti- 
tutional theory. 
2. Agency Theory 
2.1. Origin of Agency Theory 
Organisational theories have been developed by modern 
researchers with the driving force from Adam Smith’s 
“Wealth of Nations”. Adam Smith deduced that, when a 
firm is controlled by a number of people or a group of 
individuals rather than the owner of the firm, principal’s 
(shareholder or owner) objectives are highly likely to be 
diluted rather than ideally achieved. Based on Adam 
Smith’s assumption regarding the ownership and control 
separation in large firms, Berle and Means [3] argued 
that as long as ownership gets increasingly held by peo- 
ple other than owners, the industry becomes consolidated 
and hence the checks to limit the use of power tend to 
disappear (McCrew, [4]). 
However, in 1976 Jensen and Meckling [5] came up 
with the concern of ownership-control separation into a 
fully fledged agency problem which is comprised within 
the economic theory of the firm, where costs’ of agency 
problem has been identified and who bears that costs. 
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2.2. Definition of Agency Theory 
Agency theory is based on the problems related to sepa- 
ration of ownership and controllability. Jensen and 
Meckling [5] defined the agency problem as problem that 
arises when one party (Principals) makes contract with 
another party (Agents) aiming to make decisions on be- 
half of the principals. Jensen and Meckling [5] further 
argued that when the management interest is low, there is 
a greater likelihood that the management involves itself 
in value decreasing activities. An agency problem occurs 
as agents tend to hide information from the principals 
and take actions in order to achieve their own interest 
(Enron, WorldCom, Marconi and Royal Ahold). 
An agency problem comes into play when the CEO 
sets some goals which contradict of those shareholders. 
This problem occurs when the CEO has little or no inter- 
est in the outcome of his decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 
[5]; Fama and Jensen, [6]). Boyd [7] asserts that the CEO 
is likely to implement such a strategy that will maximise 
his or her personal interest at the expense of sharehold- 
ers’ while at little or no risk to him or her. 
Craig [8] deduced that agency relationship refers to 
many relationships involved in the delegation of decision 
making from one party (Principal) to another party 
(Agent). This definition considers that shareholding per-
suades delegation of managerial responsibility from 
firm’s principals to their upper ranked agents. Delegation 
and various risks cause a moral hazard to the executives. 
Jensen [9] asserts that such moral hazard to executives 
gives opportunity to seek for additional compensation 
through opportunistic means such as perquisites, shirking 
and free-riding and at the same time the principals are 
motivated to increase their monitoring fees and incen-
tives. 
Jensen and Meckling [5] defined the agency costs as 
the inevitable loss of firm value that arises with the 
agency problems along with the costs of contractual 
monitoring and bonding. Watts and Zimmerman [10] 
developed Positive Accounting theory which focuses on 
the relationship between various individuals involved in 
providing resources to an organisation. This could be the 
relationship between the owners (as suppliers of equity 
capital) and the managers (as suppliers of managerial 
labour). PAT assumes that self interest is driven by indi- 
vidual actions. Or in other words, principal and agent are 
fully wary in maximizing their own wealth. It is assumed 
that agency theory believes that the agents (management) 
are not always likely to act in the best interest of the 
owners (principals). Such assumption requires the prin- 
cipals to consider appropriate incentives or bonus scheme 
for the agent and at the same time set up proper monitor- 
ing mechanism so that any unusual activities can be con- 
trolled. Three types of costs have been identified by Jen- 
sen and Meckling [5] due to agency problem, namely: 
 Monitoring costs 
 Bonding costs 
 Residual loss 
2.3. Monitoring Costs 
Craig [8] argues that assuming managers (agents) will be 
responsible for preparing the financial statements, there 
will be attempt to overstate profits thereby increasing the 
ultimate share of incentives or bonus as their (agent) ac- 
tions are self interest driven. On the other hand Jensen 
and Meckling [5] deduce that principal and agent are 
concerned in maximizing their own interest or wealth, 
while agents (decision makers) may not take actions in 
the best interest of the owners (principals). Therefore 
both Jensen and Meckling [5] and Craig [8] presume that 
the principal has to monitor the agents by setting up 
monitoring mechanisms which could be in the form of 
hiring external auditors who will audit the financial re- 
ports. The cost of undertaking an audit is referred to as 
monitoring costs. In fact Jensen and Meckling [5] argued 
that monitoring is a comprehensive term as it contains 
controls and does not merely observe and measure mana- 
ger’s performance but rather sets budget restrictions and 
operating rules. 
2.4. Bonding Costs 
As agents are concerned on maximizing their own wealth, 
a mechanism can be established that will align the inter- 
est of the managers (agent) of the firm with those of the 
owners (shareholder) (Henderson et al. [11]). Mecha- 
nisms of aligning interest may include providing the 
manager with profit share of the firm based on account- 
ing outcome or performance. Such accounting based 
alignment highly requires producing financial statements 
(Craig, [8]). Managers are required to bond themselves to 
prepare these financial statements which are costly and 
referred to as bonding cost. However, Jensen and Meck- 
ling [5] argued that agents may take action by spending 
resources in assuring that it would not take actions which 
would not have negative effect on the principal, which is 
considered as bonding costs. For instance, bond provided 
by the agent. 
2.5. Residual Loss 
However, though the monitoring and bonding costs are 
incurred, there may still be lose to the principals pro- 
vided that the agents make decisions that are different 
from those that could maximize principals’ interest (Wil- 
liamson, [12]). This lose is recognised as residual loss. In 
general, monitoring and bonding costs are incurred in 
order to minimize or reduce the agency problem. How- 
ever, unlike the assumption of self interest that individuals 
take that aim to benefit the principal there will be no 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                  ME 
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need to take such initiatives. Craig [8] argues that not all 
the actions of agents can be controlled by monitoring or 
contractual arrangements or otherwise, there will always 
be some residual costs associated with appointing agents. 
Williamson [12] argues that principals might seek to 
minimize residual cost, since it is considered as key cost.  
In addition dilution is very common in corporations. 
When owner of a firm sells a portion of the equity firm’s 
to others, dilution of ownership occurs and this situation 
separates the ownership and control. Dilution can happen 
for various reasons, for instance to attain better efficacy 
by distributing some portions of ownership rights. Usual- 
ly the old principal holds with the controlling power 
rather than the new principal. In this vein, the old prince- 
pal operates the firm as agent aiming to protect new 
principals’ interest. 
In this situation new principal may feel that the deci- 
sion made by the older owner or agent requires to be 
monitored, in expectation of divergence of interests. Here, 
the new principal may tend to deduct likely monitoring 
costs from the price payable to the old principal for buy- 
ing shares. Such a payment strategy decreases old prin- 
cipal’s wealth. Moreover, old principal (agent) may re- 
quire making bond in order to provide assurance to the 
new principal. And bonding cost will be borne by the old 
principal. In order to ensure that the agency costs are at 
the minimum level, old principal bears all the costs from 
the separation of ownership and control. 
In some circumstances, owners of the firm may decide 
to dispense with the entire ownership. Jensen and Meck- 
ling [5] deduce that the degree to which owner may dis- 
pense or dilute the ownership status is based on factors 
which could include sum of monitoring and bonding 
costs allied to the separation of ownership and control in 
relation to controlling wholly owned over partially 
owned resources. 
There are mixed evidence in respect of this prediction 
of agency theory. The board member responsible for the 
executive management is called the managing director or 
chief executive officer. When chairman is also perform- 
ing the role of CEO, that refers to CEO duality. CEO is 
responsible for the running of board as well as operating 
the firm. Such duality is found in a number of countries 
such as Australia, and the United States. Donalson and 
Davis [13] argue that a small portion of firms in Austra- 
lia have CEO duality, while 80 percent of companies in 
the United States have CEOs who also hold the position  
of chairman (Kesner and Dalton, [14]). Various studies 
found that in combining of these two roles individual 
become so much powerful, as it ought not to be (Ahmed, 
[15]; Davis, [16]; Rechner and Dalton, [17]). However, 
subsequently the dual leadership has dropped from 80 
percent to 60 percent by 2003, which is shown in the 
Table 1 below. 
When CEO also holds the position of board chair, the 
role of the board as monitoring and control mechanism is 
compromised. According to the agency theory while the 
CEO is also the board chair, it weakens board monitoring 
and control and in this situation it is likely that share- 
holders’ interests will be sacrificed at a degree in favour 
of management. Their opportunistic activities could re- 
sult in higher levels of executive compensation (Levy, 
[19]; Dayton, [20]). 
Consequently, an agency problem exists when the 
CEO has established goals that are at variance with those 
of shareholders. Such problem is more likely to occur 
when the CEO has little or no financial interest in the 
outcome of his decisions (Jensen and Meckling, [5]; 
Fama and Jensen, [6]). 
2.6. Views on Agency Theory 
There are several findings which validate agency theory 
from different contexts. These Studies include Denis and 
Serin, [21]; Kehoe, [22]; Krishnan and Loch, [23] who 
pursued their research on public offer of new capital or 
initial public offering (IPO), set up of franchisee and 
labour union transactions respectively. 
Denis and Serin [21] in particular, argue that managers 
in firm incorporate diversifications because their private 
benefits related with diversified portfolio (pecuniary 
which is incentives and non-pecuniary such as power, 
Jensen and Meckling, [5]). This suggests that diversifica- 
tion can lead to value reduction as firm trades at a dis- 
count as against their single segment peers. Franchisee 
set up is efficient in mitigating agency problems (Kehoe, 
[22]). This is because franchisee compensates from the 
residual claims of their individual units. Hence, they bear 
the cost proportionately based on the units owned. On the 
other hand, Jensen and Meckling [5] argue that in the 
context of Anglo-American corporate governance system 
is an agency relationship that agents will not act to 
maximise the returns of principals unless corporate gover- 
nance mechanisms are set to minimize the divergence of 
 
Table 1. Dual leadership in USA. 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Avg 
Distribution of the duality 
Number of firms with dual CEOs 65.49 63.45 61.74 61.88 60.23 62.56 
Source: Chia et al. [18]. 
A. AL MAMUN  ET  AL. 40 
 
interests between shareholders and managers or in other 
words principal and agents. 
Finally it can be posited that agency theory is a signi- 
ficant proposition in firm discipline. The theory as- 
sumes that when ownership and control is separated in a 
firm, the CEO, and manager act as agent on behalf of 
the principal (makes decisions) tends to bringing moral 
hazards by seizing wealth which happens at the expense 
of owner. Therefore, it is suggested that the owner set up 
corporate governance mechanisms that will deter the 
CEO, managers (agent) from such behaviour. Mecha- 
nisms could be various incentive plans including share 
issue, options and share of profit. These incentives are 
either monitoring by principal or bonding by agent. In 
Figure 1, agency theory mentioned in the following fi- 
gure. 
2.7. Corporate Governance Responses to Agency 
Problem 
Jensen and Meckling [5] found that the important role of 
monitoring in agency relationships that authority does 
not scan further the way how large firms attain efficient 
monitoring or the way firms construct corporate govern- 
ance aiming to control the agency costs created due to 
the separation of control and ownership. However, effi- 
cient control of agency problem in large firms is pursued 
by establishment of internal devices in response to com- 
petitor firms or competition from other firms (Fama, 
[25]). Fama [5] further argues that individual managers 
within the firm are controlled by the discipline of market 
and opportunities for their services both within and out- 
side the firm. 
Fama and Jensen [6] argue that firms segregate deci- 
sion making process and decision control both at top 
level and lower level of the firm hierarchy, where top 
level refers to the board and managers and lower level 
refers to the managers and workers. Here, decision ma-  
nagement is explained as carrying out a firm’s function 
and decision control is explained as overseeing the per- 
formance of the decision management function. 
Fama and Jensen [6] argue that the reason behind con- 
trasting decision management and decision control is to 
avoid situations where agent without ownership of firm 
may intend to maximize own wealth by decisions which 
may not be for the best interest of the principal. Board of 
directors are appointed by the principals as response of 
corporate governance to minimize or control the agency 
problem which arises with senior managers including the 
CEO. Board of directors have the authority of decision 
control whilst authority of decision management rights is 
vested in the senior managers. Ahmed [15] suggests that 
shareholder and CEO relationship will inevitably become 
problematic as managerial actions depart from those re-
quired by shareholders to maximise their own interest 
and shareholders seek to prevent CEO from maximising 
their wealth. In this vein, corporate governance is con- 
cerned with the constraints that are applied to minimise 
the opportunistic activities of the CEO, hence, reduce the 
agency problem. 
In a similar vein, management control system is also 
designed with the expectation that managers oversee the 
tasks carried out by the lower level managers and work- 
ers. Stettler [26] argues that the operational and account- 
ing duties be separated. There is no conflict of interest as 
the resources held by the principal in such situation re- 
sulted from the segregation of decision management and 
decision control, while decision maker is also the princi- 
pal. 
3. Stakeholder Theory 
In recent years, the concept of stakeholder has achieved 
widespread popularity among academics, the media and 
corporate managers. Now the question that rises is: what 
is stakeholder theory? There are different definitions given  
 
 
Lubatkin et al. [24]. 
Figure 1. Agency theory’s view of principal agent relationship. 
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on stakeholder theory by different scholars. Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) defined stakeholder theory in 
1963 as “those groups without whose support the or- 
ganisation would cease to exist”. This definition was 
modified by Freeman [27] who defined stakeholder theo- 
ry as those groups who are vital to the survival and suc- 
cess of the organisation. It is obvious that the definition 
given is organisation oriented. However, in earlier re- 
searcher stakeholder was defined as “any group or indi- 
vidual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organisation objectives” (Freeman, [28]). Fried- 
man [29] however argued that the definition given by 
Freeman [28] is more balanced and takes wider area than 
the definition given by SRI (1963) this is because it in- 
cludes individuals outside the firm and that groups may 
consider themselves to be stakeholders of an organisation 
without the firm considering them to be such. In addition, 
Gray, Owen and Adams [30] stated that stakeholders are 
identified by the organisation of concern, by reference to 
the extent to which the organisation believes the inter- 
play with each group needs to be managed in order to 
further the interests of the organisation. Conventionally, 
interest of the organisation is nothing but profit seeking 
assumption. In Freeman’s definitional perspective, the 
organisation is seen as part of a larger social system. 
Stakeholders would include shareholders, employees, 
customers, lenders, suppliers, local charities, various 
interest groups and governments. 
Similarly, in Figure 2, Craig [8] asserted that the view 
of stakeholder theory is that all the stakeholders have 
right to be provided with information about how the or- 
ganisation is affecting them (perhaps through pollution, 
community sponsorship, provision of employment, safety 
initiatives, etc.), even if they choose not to use the infor- 
mation and even if they cannot directly affect the sur- 
vival of the organisation. Figure 1 depicts the inter rela- 
tionship between various stakeholders. Such practice will 
increase the transparency of organisational activities and 
performance. Therefore, it can be said that stakeholder 
theory can assist firms to achieve one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms, which is transparency, while 
according to the Gray, Owen and Adams [30] practicing 
stakeholder theory helps organisation to achieve the or- 
ganisational goals which include increasing profitability. 
Ullmann [31] argues that the greater the importance to 
the organisation of the stakeholder’s resources/support, 
the greater the probability that a particular stakeholder’s 
expectations will be accommodated within the organisa-
tion’s operations. This perspective includes various ac- 
tivities such as public reporting. Moreover, organisations 
will have an incentive to disclose information about their 
various programs and initiatives to the stakeholder 
groups concerned to clearly indicate that they are con- 
forming to those stakeholders’ expectations, as organisa- 
tions must necessarily balance the expectations of vari- 
ous stakeholder groups. 
Within the same line of thought, Roberts (p. 598) [32] 
argued that stakeholder related activities are useful in 
developing and maintaining satisfactory relationships 
with stockholders, creditors and other related parties. 
Developing a corporate reputation through performing 
and disclosing necessary reports activities is part of a 
strategy for managing stakeholder relationships. Dis- 
closing necessary reporting to the shareholders is the 
duty of management and proper disclosure can build 
good relationship between owners and managers while at 
the same time reducing agency problem. However, 
stakeholder theory does not directly provide prescriptions 
about what information should be disclosed (Craig, [8]) 
other than indicating that the provision of information, 
including information within an annual report can, if 
thoughtfully considered, be useful for the continued op- 
erations of a business entity. 
Quite a number of companies have developed and run 
 
 
Source: Craig [8]. 
Figure 2. Stakeholder theory. 
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their business in terms highly consistent with stakeholder 
theory. These firms include JandJ, eBay, Google, Lincoln 
Electric, AES featured in Built to last and Good to Great 
(Collins, [33]; Collins and Porras, [34]) continued to 
provide compelling examples of how managers under- 
stand the core insights of stakeholder theory and use 
them to create outstanding business. Freeman et al. [35] 
asserted that the concept of stakeholder theory can vary 
from individuals to individuals, as it does not follow that 
we should cast it as everything non-shareholder oriented. 
Here it is significant to remember that shareholders are 
one of the stakeholders. Freeman [27] argues that segre- 
gating shareholder for instance from stakeholder concept 
is nothing but contrasting apples with fruit. Shareholders 
are one of the stakeholders and it does not get us any- 
where to try to contrast the two. Therefore, stakeholder 
theory can help firms to achieve organisational goals 
resulting from satisfying shareholders. Freeman et al. [27] 
further argued that stakeholder theory gives managers 
more resources and a greater capability to deal with 
companies’ internal problem. 
Freeman et al. [27] concluded that creating value for 
stakeholders creates value for shareholders. In supporting 
stakeholder view, Etzioni [36] concludes that the moral 
legitimacy of the claim that shareholders have certain 
rights and entitlements as shareholders sink their capital, 
but Etzioni [36] maintains that “the same basic claim 
should be extended to all those who invest in the corpo- 
ration”. This includes: employees (especially those who 
worked for a corporation for many years and loyally); the 
community (to the extent special investments are made 
that specifically benefit that corporation); creditors (es- 
pecially large, long-term ones); and, under some condi- 
tions, clients. 
However Goodpaster [37] criticises that a multi-fidu- 
ciary stakeholder approach has failed to recognize that 
the relationship between management and stockholders is 
ethically different in kind from the relationship between 
management and other parties (like employees, suppliers, 
customers, etc.). Goodpaster [37] further argues that 
though managers have many non-fiduciary duties to 
various stakeholder groups, their fiduciary duties are 
only to shareholders. 
4. Stewardship Theory 
According to scholars, though agency theory has its ori- 
gin in economics, stewardship theory has evolved from 
psychology and sociology. Stewardship theory grew out 
of the seminal work by Donaldson and Davis [38] and 
was developed as a model where senior executives act as 
stewards for the organization and in the best interests of 
the principals. The model given by Donaldson and Davis 
[38] asserts that managers will make decisions and act in 
the best interest of the firm, putting collectivist options 
above self-serving options. Notably, stewards are moti- 
vated only by making the right decisions which are in the 
best interest of the organisation, as there is strong as- 
sumption that stewards will benefit, if the firm is pros- 
pered. At the same time, stewardship theory presumes 
that executives and managers’ main duty is maximizing 
firm performance, while working under the premise as so; 
both principal and stewards can be benefited from the 
performance of the organisation.  
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson [39] defined stewar- 
dship theory as “a steward protects and maximises share- 
holders wealth through firm performance, because by 
doing so, the steward’s utility functions are maximized”. 
In this definition, the writers identified firm executives 
and managers as the stewards working for the principal. 
Later, Block [40] suggested the stewardship role as “ser-
vice over self-interest” believing that both organizational 
and individual needs will be achieved at the best by 
honouring relationships and treating followers like 
“owners and partners”. In extension of stewardship the-
ory definition, Caldwell and Karri [41] posited that there 
are covenantal duties owed to all stakeholders that ac- 
knowledged the importance of a systemic fit of organiza- 
tion governance with the conditions of its environment. 
However, stewardship can simply be defined as a beha- 
viour that places the long term interest of the organisa- 
tion as well as the shareholders a head of individuals’ 
self-interest. Company executives and managers are 
aimed to protect and make profits for the principals 
(shareholders), while in agency theory, firm executives 
and managers aim to work for their self interest. On the 
other hand, Donaldson and Daivis, [38] argued that 
stewardship theory ignores individualism, rather firm 
executives and managers play their role as stewards by 
aligning their interest along with the organisation goals. 
According to the Figure 3, in fact, stewardship concept 
suggests that successful organisation leads to happiness 
and hence motivate stewards, not individual success or 
goals attained (Abdullah and Valentine, [2]). 
Unlike agency theory, the principal espouses steward- 
ship theory which empowers managers and executives 
with the information and the equipment and the power 
believing that they will make decisions in the best inter- 
est of the organisation and for the principals. It enables 
the decision makers to act on behalf of the firm and for 
the firm, having faith that they will maximise the long 
term return of the firm. Argyris [42] noted that placing 
control structure or monitoring on executives or mana- 
gers ultimately discourages them and will result in un- 
productive outcomes for the organisation as well as prin- 
cipals and stewards. Stewardship theory believes in act- 
ing in the best interest of the organisation, unlike agency 
theory, therefore it argues that any control or monitoring  
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Source: Abdullah and Valentine [2]. 
Figure 3. Stewardship theory model. 
 
structure may de-motivate decision makers, which may 
have negative impact on firm performance. 
However, in order not to place the full authority to the 
stewards without any control and monitoring structures, 
principals are required to get rid of the typical assump- 
tions which are the result of agency theory. Principals are 
required to build the requisite trusting relationship with 
executives and managers. Placing the authority can help 
the stewards to make decisions independently for best 
interest of the organisation. Though agency theory talks 
about focusing on controlling cost and minimizing 
downside, stewardship theory focuses on maximizing the 
upside of the relationship (Donaldson and Davis, [38]).  
While working on high-commitment organisations, 
Walton [43] found there is consistency between the di-
mensions of open communications and empowerment. 
Later the same findings empirically tested by Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson [39] where research found a 
series of factors which describe the management phi- 
losophy of stewardship, those series of factors include 
trust, open communication, empowerment, long-term 
orientation and performance enhancement. Stewardship 
theory is the combination of all these factors. Trust di- 
mension is significant in building relationships between 
stewards and principals, so that principals can place the 
authority to executives and managers to get the works 
done in the best interest of organisations.  
However, as decision makers, executives and manag- 
ers have to maintain their reputation to lead the firm in 
such a way that it maximizes the profitability resulting in 
maximum returns to the principals invested capital (Daily 
et. al. [44]). Here individual performance is impacted by 
the firm’s performance. Therefore, executives and mana- 
gers are managing and working for the firms having in-
tention to be seen as effective stewards in the organisa-
tion (Fama, [5]). For example, Abdullah and Valentine [2] 
argued that stewardship model can be better linked to 
Japan, as employees in Japan take the role of stewards 
and ownership diligently. On the other hand, Shleifer and 
Vishny [45] proposed that managers and executives re- 
turn finance to investors to establish a good reputation so 
that that they can re-enter the market for future finance. 
From stewardship theory perspective unifying the 
CEO and chairman role is effective as this can reduce 
agency costs resulting in a great role of stewards in the 
organisation. Abdullah and Valentine [2] suggested that 
such stewardship can help to safeguard the interest of the 
principals (shareholders). Donaldson and Davis [2] pro- 
posed that combining both theories can bring improve- 
ments in the returns in organisations than when separated 
and this was empirically tested. Furthermore, steward- 
ship theory identifies the significance of structures that 
empower firm executives and directors who are offered 
maximum autonomy to build on trust (Donaldson and 
Davis, [38]). It emphasises for managers and directors to 
act more as an individual to maximize the firm’s profita- 
bility resulting in the maximization of shareholder’s re-
turn on invested capital. Wealth creation is a variable 
sum opportunity that is synergistic and practical. Hosmer 
[46] argued that the manager’s role is to maximize the 
potential of the organization to pursue long-term wealth 
creation with organizational and individual goals best 
achieved by pursuing collective ends. Peggy and Hugh 
[47] argued that unlike agency theory, stewardship the- 
ory helps in aligning the goals of managers and share- 
holders. When managers and shareholders’ goals are 
aligned, firm performance is expected to increase as there 
is no conflict of self-interest.  
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5. Institutional Theory 
Coase [48] proposed that institutions were created by 
human beings to decrease the uncertainties of transac-
tions between economic agents, where a major part of 
those uncertainties are due to opportunistic human be- 
haviour (Williamson, [49]). Williamson [49] further ar- 
gued that without institutions and markets firms may 
have never existed and transactions could have never 
begun. Traditional definition of institutions are found as 
what we regard or do not regard as acceptable and thus 
determine the framework in which any action finds its 
legitimacy. Suchman [50] argued that an organisation 
cannot survive without legitimacy: an approval of its 
general environment that its actions are desirable, suit- 
able and are adapted, with the interior of the standards, 
values and beliefs system, socially built. Later in 2005, 
Krishna and Das [51] made similar conclusion, where 
they posited that, institutional perspective assumes that 
the environment recognises and empowers institutions to 
award firms, or withhold from firms, resources such as 
legitimacy. The tenets of institutional theory are also best 
met in a business environment with high level of regula- 
tion. 
Institutional theory argues that organisations are not 
just a place where goods and services are produced rather 
these are also social and cultural systems. In other words, 
firms not only engage themselves in competition but le- 
gitimised themselves also. A major paper in the develop- 
ment of institutional theory was by DiMaggio and Powell 
[52] who defined an institutional field as those organisa- 
tions that in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resources, regulatory 
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar 
products and services. 
DiMaggio and Powell [52] viewed the process by 
which organisations tend to adopt the same structures 
and practice “isomorphism”. Isomorphism is a process 
that causes one unit in a population to resemble other 
units in the population that face the same set of environ- 
mental conditions. DiMaggio and Powell [52] found 
three different isomorphism processes namely coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphism.  
Coercive isomorphism arises when organisations 
change their institutional practices in response to pres- 
sure from stakeholders upon whom the organisation is 
dependent. Company is coerced into adapting its existing 
voluntary corporate reporting practices, where stake- 
holders are taken into consideration. Once the voluntary 
corporate reporting is adopted, stakeholders are pleased 
with the organisation. Such practice will help the organi- 
sation to be competitive on the market resulting positive 
firm performance. 
Institutional theory pressures to meet certain standards 
of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, [45]), 
which is linked to firm performance. Krishna and Das 
[51] argued that institutional perspectives on corporate 
governance are best met in an environment with high 
levels of regulatory efficiency. This finding is similar to 
Kathleen [53] where it mentioned that organisations are 
the way they are for no other reason than that the way 
they are is the legitimate way to organise. The key con-
cept of this idea is that organisational actions evolve over 
time and become legitimated within an organisation and 
an environment. 
Seal [54] asserted that the significance of institution 
theory is the openness about human behaviour and or- 
ganisational practices. This theory also offers the way, 
how to link the institutionally informed management 
accounting research that has been increasingly adopted at 
the organisational level to the wider political, legal and 
social processes associated with corporate governance 
and professionalization. 
Kathleen [53] made a comparison between agency 
theory and institutional theory depicted in Table 2 be- 
low. 
In this business sustainability journal we have discover 
the reality of different approach that exists in effective 
corporate governing. No one theory can give us the best 
performance result but a combination of all can deliver 
the business need and keep the organization running 
while balancing the principal and the manager rights over 
the business. In Figure 4, we have seen how this has 
over lapping effect on the other three theories, Like, the 
institutional theory states that firms not only engage 
themselves in competition but legitimised themselves. 
On the other hand, Stewardship theory is defined as 
“stewards protect and maximise shareholders wealth 
through firm performance. By doing so, the steward’s 
utility functions are maximized”. Hence the link is clear 
how institutional theory is a subset of stewardship theory. 
Agency theory is based on the problems related to 
separation of ownership and controllability. In Freeman’s 
definitional perspective, the organisation is seen as part 
of a larger social system. Stakeholders would include 
shareholders, employees, customers, lenders, suppliers, 
local charities, various interest groups and governments. 
So we can see how various stakeholders if left to make 
decision alone can open up sever loophole in principal 
wealth protection. Therefore, in order to strengthen cor- 
poration effectiveness we need to emphasise in all of 
them. As agency theory dictate that the greater likelihood 
that the management involves itself in value decreasing 
activities. An agency problem occurs as agents tend to 
hide information from the principals and take actions in 
order to achieve their own interest (Enron, WorldCom, 
Marconi and Royal Ahold). With the above theory we 
can see how stakeholder theory proves agency theory 
about each component of an organization take action  
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Table 2. Comparison between agency theory and institutional theory. 
 Agency theory Institutional theory 
Key idea 
Organisational practices arise from efficient organisation of  
information and risk breaking costs 
Organisational practices arise from imitative  
and firm traditions 
Basis of organisation Efficiency Legitimacy 
View of people Self-interested rationalists Legitimacy-seeking satisfiers 
Role of environment Organisational practices should fit environment 
A source of practices to which organisation  
conforms 
Role of technology Organisational practices should fit technology employed 
Technology moderates the impact of institutional 
factors or can be determined institutionally 
Problem domain Control problems (vertical integration, compensation, regulation) Organisational practices, in general 
Independent variables outc Outcome uncertainty, span of control, programmability 
Industry traditions, legislation, social and 
political beliefs, founding conditions that  
comprise the institutional 
Assumptions 
People are self-employed  
People are rational 
People are risk-averse 
People satisfied  












Figure 4. Analyse the theories. 
 
agency theory. according to their own benefit. 
Now if we look at the Institutional theory and agency 
theory, these two theories have distinct differences. One 
emphasises on the Management ethics and the other talks 
about the formation of social culture of organization life. 
As the organization continues to exist, it also develops a 
unique personality in which agency theory comes in and 
ultimately the principal might lose control and proving  
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Though there are a number of theories related to corpo- 
rate governance, the evolution of agency theory, stake- 
holder theory, stewardship theory and institutional theory 
explain the CEO/chairman duality, audit committee and 
the role of management most. These four theories are  
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considered as the fundamental theories of corporate gov- 
ernance. In considering the stakeholder theory and insti- 
tutional theory, it can be deduced that corporate govern-
ance is more towards social relationships rather than 
structure. All the four theories discussed above mostly on 
the perception that principals get return on their invest- 
ment in the firm. The various models of corporate gov- 
ernance that exist globally have evolved as economies 
and the corporate structure were shaped, simply follow- 
ing convention, or based on environmental influences 
such as worldview, culture, and the legislative and po- 
litical framework. Due to abrupt changes in external and 
internal business environment, corporate governance also 
changes constantly. External environmental factors in- 
clude business collaborations, financial funding, new 
business venture, technological advancements, mergers 
and acquisitions, while internal environmental factors 
include shareholders, stakeholders and profit maximiza- 
tion of the firm. All these environmental factors result in 
changes directly or indirectly to corporate governance. 
Corporate governance mechanisms may differ from 
country to country based on economic positions, political 
and cultural situations. 
Hofstede and Hofstede [55] argued that the rele
an
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